Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 14

January 1985

Summaries: Indian Law
Margaret Crow

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Margaret Crow, Summaries: Indian Law, 15 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1985).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Crow: Summaries: Indian Law

INDIAN LAW
KIRSCHLING v. UNITED STATES: ALLOTMENT
PROCEEDS EXEMPT FROM GIFT TAX

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Enough to say that in our view this attempt to tax evidences, at the least a sorry breach of faith with the Indians.1Il
Kirschling v. United States 2 presented the Ninth Circuit
with an issue of first impression as to the applicability of federal
gift tax to a transfer of timber allotment proceeds from a noncompetent Indians to a non-Indian. Reversing and remanding a
district court summary judgment in favor of the government, the
Ninth Circuit held that the transfer was exempt from gift tax.

After obtaining special allotment timber cutting permits,
plaintiff, Helen Kirschling negotiated the sale of $2,280,702.00
worth of timber from her allotments on the Quinault Indian
Reservation in Washington. 4 The proceeds were deposited in her
Individual Indian Money account at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Shortly thereafter she withdrew $850,000.00 in the
form of a check from the BIA and converted $750,000.00 into
cashier's checks payable to Duane Grandorff, a non-Indian:1
On her 1976 gift tax return, Kirschling stated that the
1. Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1954) aff'd 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
2. 746 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1984)(per Farris, J.; the other panel members were
Fletcher, J. and Craig, District Judge sitting by designation.).
3. "The term 'noncompetent Indian' refers to one who holds land under a trust patent and who may not alienate or encumber that land without the consent of the United
States." [d. at 513 n.1 (citing Hoptowit v. Comm'r, 709 F.2d 564,565 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983).
4. 746 F.2d at 513.
5. [d. The IRS assessed a deficiency against Grandorft' alleging that the transfer was
income for past service rendered. The Tax Court suit was stayed pending the outcome of
this case. [d. at 514.
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transfer was exempt because it was a gift of Indian trust funds.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contested the exemption
and assessed a deficiency of $174,112.50. After paying the deficiency, Kirschling brought an action for a refund claiming that a
gift of proceeds of allotted property was not taxable. The government contested the characterization of the transfer as a gift
and additionally, argued that the General Allotment Act of
18876 did not imply any exemption for such gifts.
The district court granted partial summary judgment for
the government on the issue of the taxability of gifts of allotment proceeds and later set a trial date to determine whether
this transfer was a gift or compensation for services rendered. 7
Prior to trial, the district court granted a summary judgment for
the government on the grounds that the Internal Revenue Code
barred the plaintiff from recovering on a theory different from
that set forth in her refund claim. 8
II.

BACKGROUND

Cases on taxation related to Indian allotments have partially focused on the congressional intent behind the General Allotment Act of 1887.9 The Act served as the government's primary tool in efforts to assimilate tribal Indians by breaking up
reservation lands. 10 Parcels of reservation lands were allotted to
individual Indians for the purposes of encouraging agricultural
activity. The government held the allotments in trust for
twenty-five years or longer at the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior.l1
6. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§331-411 (1976)).
7. 82-1 USTC (CCH) 1113,443 at 84,225 (W.O. Wa. Sept. 2, 1981). The district court
held that the transfer was taxable because it was made to a non-Indian and because the
allottee received the proceeds in fee simple prior to the transfer.
8. 746 F.2d at 514.
9. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-411 (1976)).
10. The trust status of most allotted lands has been indefinitely extended by Executive Orders. Exec. Order No. 10,191, 15 Fed. Reg. 8889 (1950); 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
See also 25 U.S.C. § 462 which states that "[tlhe existing periods of trust placed on
Indian land and any restriction or alienation thereof are extended and continued until
otherwise directed by Congress."
11. By the time the policy of assimilation through allotment programs ended with
the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 48 Stat. 984, as amended 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-69 (1970), most reservations had become a checkerboard of individual Indian allotments, tribal lands and non-Indian homesteads composed of non-allotted or
formerly allotted lands. The IRA sought to reestablish tribes as self-governing entities by
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During the trust period the Indian had limited control over
the land, requiring government approval to sell, lease, or encumber it. At the end of the trust period the Act provided for conveyance by a patent "discharged of said trust and free of all
charge or encumberance whatsoever."12 The Act also allowed the
Secretary to issue a patent in fee simple at any time the Indian
allottee was adjudged "competent and capable of managing his
or her own affairs."ls Such a determination was recognized by
issuance of a certificate of competency. In 1906 Congress
amended the Act to remove "all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance, or taxation" of allotted lands received in fee simple. l•
Disregarding the general language of the General Allotment
Act, the Tenth Circuit in Jones u. Taunah1r. held that federal
income tax applied to income earned by Indians from their allotments unless explicity statutory language exempted that income. 18 When the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion
on indistinguishable facts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the tension between the requirements of explicit language for granting tax exemptions and the rule of statutory construction requiring ambiguities to be resolved in favor of
Indians. 17
In 1956, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Squire u
Capoeman l8 which seemed to be the definitive answer on federal
taxation of income derived from Indian allotments. With facts
8ubstituting tribal ownership for the allotment system. For a discussion of the tax implications of these shifts in characterization of Indian trust lands, see Fiske and Wilson,
Federal Taxation of Indian Income From Restricted Indian Lands, 10 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 63 (1975).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976).
14.Id.
15. 186 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1951). The Indian allottees in this case had received
income from agricultural leases, oil and gas rentals and royalties and from an oil lease
bonus, all directly derived from their allotments.
16. Id. at 448. The dissent held that the combination of the General Allotment Act
and the applicable treaty allowed exemption of the income from oil and gas royalties
though not of the interest on the income. Id. at 449-50. (Phillips, C.J., dissenting in
part.)
17. "We may add that while the court below appeared to regard as distinguishable
the decision of the Tenth Circuit. . . we can see no ground upon which the holding can
be distinguished. Rather, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Phillips."
Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d 349, 350 (9th Cir. 1951).
18. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
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strikingly similar to Kirschling, the Court held that timber sale
proceeds from an allotment were exempt from capital gains
tax. Ie It rejected the assertion that this was an ordinary tax case
in which exemptions to tax laws must be express in order to be
valid.lIo Interpreting the applicable treaty, the General Allotment
Act and congressional policy towards Indians, the Court found
that Congress intended to subject Indians allotments to all taxes
only after a patent in fee simple had been issued to the allottee.
Through the General Allotments Act Congress expressed its intent that income directly derived from the allotted land be exempt from all taxation. 21 Without such an implication of exemption, the policy of assimiliation, the stated purpose of the Act,
would have been hindered.

III.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the lower court's conclusion that the General Allotment Act could not be interpreted
to exempt allotment proceeds from gift taxation.lIli The court
19. The Indian allottees in both Capoeman and Kirschling were members of the
Quinault Indian Tribe and all sought relief from taxes imposed on income received from
sale of timber from their allotments. The most interesting difference in the cases is the
amount of income involved in each case. Proceeds from the sale of trees from 93.5 acres
of allotted lands brought the Capoemans $15,080.80 in 1943. 351 U.S. at 4.
The system of timber sales at the time was managed by the government to the disadvantage of individual sellers who received between one-third and one-half of the prevailing market value for their timber. This was because the government placed enormous
tracts of forest lands, including federal holdings as well as Indian trust lands, of varying
quality and accessibility up for bid at one time. [d. at 4 n. 7. Kirschling negotiated her
own sale thus receiving more than $2.2 million for her timber. The district court pointedly noted that she could rely on Copoeman to "avoid income tax on the substantial
income she must have realized" as though the amount of income had a relationship to
the doctrine permitting tax exemptions. 82-1 USTC 1113,443 at 84,228 (emphasis added).
20. We agree with the government that Indians are citizens and that in
ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial
legislation, they are subject to the payment of income taxes as
are other citizens. We also agree that, to be valid, exemptions
to tax laws should be clearly expressed. But we cannot agree
that the taxability of respondents in these circumstances is
unaffected by the treaty, the trust patent or the General Allotment Act.
351 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added.)
21. The Court found that the language of section 5 of the General Allotment Act,
"free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever" could be reasonably interpreted to mean
exemption from taxation. 351 U.S. at 7. In addition amendment to section 6 specifically
included exemption from taxation as one of the restrictions to be removed only upon
transfer of title in fee simple. [d.
22. 746 F.2d at 514.
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noted that although Capoeman concerned a capital gains tax,
the Ninth Circuit had previously held that it was not to be applied narrowly.23 In fact, the language of the holding specifically
exempted allotments from all taxation.24
Analogizing a line of cases exempting transfer of allotments
and allotments proceeds from estate tax, the court found support for its view that Capoeman applied. 211 Since the purpose of
the gift tax is to prevent avoidance of estate taxes by inter vivos
transfers of property, these analogies were properly persuasive
in this case of first impression. 2s Cases holding that ambiguous
language which could reasonably be interpreted to confer a tax
exemption for Indians must be so construed provided additional
support for the applicability of the Capoeman interpretation of
the General Allotment Act. 27
The court's analysis then shifted to whether or not the allottee had received the property in fee simple prior to making
the gift. Rejecting the government's argument that issuance of
the check by the BIA constituted receipt of allotment proceeds
in fee simple, the court found the statutory requirements for issuance of a patent in fee simple unmet. 28 The General Allotment
Act required either that the statutory trust period expire29 or
that the Indian be determined to be competent before a patent
could be issued. 30 Since those sections expressed congressional
intent to protect noncompetent Indians from all taxation until
such a patent issued, Kirschling's income from the sale of timber
was exempt from all taxation, including gift tax.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In Kirschling, the tension between strict construction of tax
23. Stevens v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 714, 744 (9th Cir. 1971).
24. "[U)ntil such time as the [fee simple) patent is issued, the allotment shall be
free from all taxes." 746 F.2d at 515 (citing Capoeman 351 U.S. at 8).
25. 746 F.2d at 151 (citing Asenap v. U.S., 283 F.Supp. 566 (W.O. Oklahoma 1968);
Nash v. Wiseman, 227 F.Supp. 552 (W.O. Oklahoma 1963».
26. 746 F.2d at 515.
27. [d. The Ninth Circuit in Stevens had noted the strong language in Capoeman
urging favorable construction of statutes touching upon the special relationship between
the government and the Indians. 452 F.2d at 744. The Supreme Court in Capoeman
noted its previous decision in Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). "Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are wards of the
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." [d. at 367.
28. 746 F.2d at 516.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976).
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exemption statutes and liberal construction of statutes and treaties concerning Indians is once again resolved clearly in favor of
the noncompetent Indian. The court will not favorably consider
arguments that Indian tax cases sought to be resolved without
reference to those statutes and treaties which specifically outline
the trust relationship. Following Capoeman, the court found the
statutory language to be sufficient to allow the exemption. 81
The unresolved issue for which Kirschling and similar cases
will be instructive, is the tax status of restricted Indian lands,
such as those reacquired from allottees under the Indian Reorganization Act, from which an individual Indian derives income. 8l1 The trends in analysis by the courts towards consideration of all relevant legislation, treaties and general Indian policy
serves as a warning to the IRS to expand its consistently narrow
view of Indian tax case precedent. 88 To continue to argue that
tax exemptions for Indians must be supported by specific statutory language is to ignore the judicial deference to the guardianward relationship as it is related to taxation. 84
Margaret Crow*

31. 746 F.2d at 516.
32. The Indian Reorganization Act provided for restoration of non-allotted lands to
tribal ownership, exchanges of Indian and non-Indian lands to effectuate consolidation
within reservations and transfers of allotted lands from individual Indian ownership
back to tribal ownership. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4634a, 463e, 464. (1970).
33. See Fiske and Wilson, supra note 10.
34. The IRS interpretation of the Capoeman decision is expressed in Revenue Ruling 67-284, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 55, which sets out a five part test for determining whether
an exemption for income derived from an allotment will be granted:
(1) The land in question is held in trust by the United States
Government;
(2) such land is restricted and allotted and is held for an individual noncompetent Indian, and not for a tribe;
(3) the income is "derived directly" from the land;
(4) the statute, treaty or other authority involved evinces
congressional intent that the allotment be used as a
means of protecting the Indian until such time as he becomes competent; and
(5) the authority in question contains language indicating
clear congressional intent that the land, until conveyed in
fee simple to the allottee, is not to be subject to taxation.
If one or more of these five test is not met, and if the
income is not otherwise exempt by law, it is subject to
Federal income taxation.
Id. at 56·57.
"It is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended to tax the ward for benefit of the
guardian." Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418, 420 (1935).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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DONOVAN v. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL FARM:
NINTH CIRCUIT APPLIES OSHA TO INDIAN FARM

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, l the Ninth Circuit held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act2 (the Act)
applied to an Indian farm due to the absence of congressional
intent to exclude Indian enterprises from coverage. In reversing
an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the
Commission) decision vacating citations and penalties assessed
against the farm,S the court held that the statute was enforceable despite arguments that the Tribe's inherent sovereign power
to exclude non-Indians barred application.·
In October, 1978, a compliance officer from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted an
inspection of two grain elevators on the Coeur d' Alene Tribal
Farm, a commercial enterprise wholly owned and operated by
the Tribe on their reservation in northern Idaho. 1I Citations were
issued for twenty-one alleged violations and fines totalling
$185.00. 8 While not challenging the facts upon which the citations were based, the Tribe claimed the Act had no application
to an Indian enterprise. 7
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the citations
and penalties. 8 Upon review, the Commission remanded the case
for reargument in light of their recent decision in Navajo Forest
Products Industries (NFPI) which held the Act inapplicable to
1. No. 84-7031, slip op. (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1985)(per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were Wright, J., and Alarcon, J.).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982).
3. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1705 (Nov. 16, 1983).
4. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, No. 84-7031, slip op. at 137.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 1980 O.S.H.D. (25,5P)54 (May 20, 1980)(per Stuller).
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an enterprise on an Indian reservation. 9 The ALJ reaffirmed the
earlier decision, distinguishing NFPI on the ground that the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe had no treaty upon which to base its claim
of sovereign powers. IO The Commission reversed and vacated the
citations on the ground that the Act did not apply to tribal enterprises because of a tribe's inherent right to exclude non-Indians. n The government then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
II.

BACKGROUND

The primary Supreme Court cases relied upon in Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm were Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation 12 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.18
These cases outline the origin and scope of tribal sovereign
powers.
Tuscarora held that the Federal Power Act authorized the
taking of twenty-two percent of Tuscarora lands which were to
be inundated by the construction of a dam.14 The Indians argued that the government could not condemn the land without
explicit statutory language authorizing application of the Act to
Indian lands. However, the Court found that the lands in question were not "tribal lands embraced within an Indian reservation" and thus not excludable under provisions of the Act. 11I
Therefore, the exercise of eminent domain powers did not conflict with any rights guaranteed by treaty and was permissible. IS
The Tuscaroras had no treaty with the United States government upon which they could rely to argue their sovereign rights
were infringed by the taking of these lands. The lack of a treaty
9. 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2094, aff'd 692 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1982). The Commission
decision in this case will be referred to as NFPI to distinguish it from the appellate court
decision which will be referred to as Navajo Forest Products.
10. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 1982 O.S.H.D. 1125,962 (Feb. 16, 1982)(per Stuller).
11. 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1708.
12. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
13. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
14. 362 U.S. at 124 (Black, J., dissenting).
15. Section 4e of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§
791a-828c, prohibited the taking of reserved land if such taking would "interfere or be
inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired." Although Section 3 (2) defined reservation as including "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservation" the majority decided that the Tuscarora Indian lands did not meet
that definition because the Indians held the lands in fee simple. The dissent found this
definition to be "wholly artificial and limited." 362 U.S. at 127 (Black, J., dissenting).
16. 362 U.S. at 124.
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has served as a distinguishing factor between this case and later
ones reaching opposite results. 17
In Merrion, the Court examined whether the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe had the power to levy severance taxes on the oil
and gas production of non-Indians on reservation lands. IS In sustaining the tax, the Court characterized the right alternatively as
one of self-governmenP9 or as derived from the right to exclude
non-Indians from the reservation. 20 The Court stated that the
right to exclude non-Indians was a "hallmark" of sovereignty.21
Both rights were deemed essential to self-government and territorial management. 22 The reservation in Merrion, like the one in
Tuscarora, was not created by a treaty with explicit language
recognizing its sovereign powers. 23 The Court noted that "the
Tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which
its reservation is established."24
During the hearings on Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, a case
with strikingly similar facts came before the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, ultimately progressing to the
Tenth Circuit. In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries,2& the court upheld a Commission decision that the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not apply to a tribal enterprise
because it violated the tribe's sovereign right to exclude non-Indians. 28 The government had argued that under the Tuscarora
holding, the Act applied to the Navajo Forest Products Industries, a timber conversion facility wholly owned and operated by
the Navajos on their reservation in New Mexico.27 The court
held that by implication Merrion overruled Tuscarora at least as
to the statement relied upon by the government that "it is now
well-settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their
17. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
18. 455 U.S. at 133.
19. Id. at 139.
20. Id. at 144.
21. Id. at 141.
22.ld.
23. The reservation was established by the Executive Order of 1887. I C. Kappler,
Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904) (order of President Cleveland).
24. 455 U.S. at 134.
25. 692 F.2d 709 (1982).
26. Id. at 714.
27. Id. at 710.
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property. "28
The court held that article II of the 1868 treaty between the
United States and the Navajo Tribe, which recognized the right
to exclude non-Indians from the reservation, applied to OSHA
inspectors. 29 Tuscarora was distinguished due to the lack of a
treaty in that case. The application of the statute did not abrogate any treaty rights which would have been the result of application of the Act in the instant case. However, the court emphasized that the Court in Merrion had clearly stated that the right
to exclude need not be explicitly expressed in a treaty in order
to be enforceable. so
The Commission's final decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Farm Sl reached several conclusions as to why the Act did not
apply to the farm. s2 The Tribe argued that the Commission's
NFPI decision governed and that the Act did not apply because
it did not express congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign powers. The government argued that NFPI, at that time on
appeal to the Tenth Circuit, ought to be overruled. ss The Commission noted two reasons why the lack of a treaty did not distinguish this case from NFPI. First, treaty making with Indian
tribes ended in 1871,s4 two years before the reservation was established by executive order.311 The executive order and the congressional approval of Articles of Agreement in 1887 served as
recognition of tribal sovereignty. Secondly, and more importantly, the specific right to exclude non-Indians is a "fundamental sovereign attribute intimately tied to a tribe's ability to protect the integrity and order of its territory and of its
members."ss Specific governmental recognition of such a right
was not essential to protect it from abrogation.
Finding no material factual distinctions between NFPI and
28. Id. at 713.
29. Id. at 711-12.
30. Id. at 712-13.
31. 11 O.S.H. Caa. (BNA) 1705 (Nov. 16. 1983).
32. Id. at 1708.
33.Id.
34. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3. 1871. ch. 120. § 1. 16 Stat. 544. 566 (codified in
part at 25 U.S.C. § 71.)
35. Exec. Order No. 1111 (1873).
36. 692 F.2d at 712 (citing Merrion. 455 U.S. at 141).
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the case before it, the Commission again rejected the government's arguments that the Tuscarora rule should apply and held
for the farm.

III.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit accepted the government's argument that
Tuscarora applied and proceeded to examine three exceptions to
the rule. Although silent on the issue of its applicability to Indian tribes, the Act would be held to apply unless it (1) touched
exclusive rights of self-government; (2) abrogated treaty rights;
or (3) showed an intent in its legislative history to exclude Indians. 87 If any of these exceptions were satisfied then the statute
must expressly state its intent to apply to Indians, a test which
this Act did not meet.
The court rejected the argument that tribally owned enterprises, such as the farm, fell within the scope of the "tribal selfgovernment" exception. The court defined the exception as applying only to intramural matters.88 The fact that such enterprises primarily serve the goals of improving economic and social
conditions on the reservation, with the profit motive secondary,
did not impress the court which characterized the farm as "a
normal commercial farming enterprise. "89
Within this same exception, the court entertained but rejected the proposition that the right to exclude non-Indians was
a "fundamental aspect" of sovereignty.4o Distinguishing Merrion
on its facts, the court stated that although Merrion recognized
the right to exclude as a "hallmark" of sovereignty, the opinion
did not address Congress' ability to alter those sovereign rights.
It rejected the Indian's contention that such alterations must be
express rather than implied. 41
Addressing the treaty rights exception, the court held that
the lack of a treaty or other document signed by the United
States specifically guaranteeing the right to exclude was fatal to
37. Slip op. at 138-39 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) cert.
denied 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
38. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, No. 84-7301, slip op. at 139.
39.Id.
40.Id.
41. Id. at 139-40.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 14

262

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:257

the claim that the Act must expressly state its intent to apply to
Indians. In rejecting Navajo Forest the court stated that "to
whatever extent the Tenth Circuit's decision is not tied to the
existence of an express treaty right, we disagree with it."·2
IV.

CONCLUSION

This opinion gives cursory treatment to the essential issue
of why a power, recognized as sovereign, will be protected only
where a treaty is found. Besides the fact that many reservations
were created without a treaty and the fact that treaties vary in
specificity, this holding ignores the Tenth Circuit's observation
that the treaty recognized rather than created the rights in
question.· 8
Under its plenary powers Congress can abrogate the sovereign rights of Indians tribes to exclude non-Indians. However, by
analogizing to cases which hold that for a general statute to abrogate treaty rights congressional intent must be clearly expressed,·· the court ought to require the same for abrogation of
inherent sovereign rights. Even though the existence of tribal
enterprises is well-known, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act does not specify application to Indian reservations. To distinguish essentially similar tribal enterprises on the basis of existence of a treaty is arbitrary and unfair to the tribes. Specific
language in the statute would lead to fair and consistent application and would avoid artificial distinctions between reservations.

Margaret Crow*

42. Id. at 140 n.3. As to the third factor from the Farris test, neither side presented
arguments that there existed in the legislative history of the Act any manifestation of
congressional intent to exclude Indians.
43. 692 F.2d at 712.
44. Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Reuiew of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 601, 623-30, (1975).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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